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Abstract 
This paper reexamines the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94: 768-776, 2010), which 
shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing 
game. They obtain this result in a model where the asymmetry among countries translates into different 
gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercept. In this note, we simply reverse the 
form of asymmetry by considering different vertical intercepts but identical gradient. The reason is that 
market power is typically related to the intercept and not to the slope of the demand function. We then 
show that the large region tax leadership becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become 
Pareto superior. 
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1 Introduction
In most tax competition models, it was assumed that countries set taxes si-
multaneously. But some authors have recently shown that tax leadership is
not only natural but could even be beneficial. Wang (1999) asserts that “it
is natural and conceivable that, in a real-world situation of tax setting, the
large region moves first” (p. 974). However, tax leadership by the large coun-
tries is assumed1 but not demonstrated, and this assumption was recently
challenged by Kempf and Rota Graziosi (2010). Using the pre-play stage as
in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to determine the equilibrium timing, they
find that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant outcome.2 To
obtain this result, they use a linear demand for capital in which the regional
asymmetry translates into different gradients but identical vertical intercept.
The large region has the smaller gradient for the demand function so that
the productivity of capital declines less rapidly with the amount of capi-
tal. We find this definition of the large region somewhat at odds with the
general perception in the asymmetric tax competition models. Indeed the
intuitive leadership by the large region is based its ability to exploit market
power. The large region has greater market power that permits to benefit
from higher tax rates. In that perspective, small region is generally thought
to face more elastic demand for capital, and therefore to have stronger incen-
tives to offer lower tax rates. Under linear demand for capital, the markup,
which measures market power, is independent of the gradient, but is related
to the vertical intercept of the demand function. In that sense, different
market power should translate into different vertical intercept but identical
gradients. That is just the opposite of what Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010)
assumed.
Adopting this alternative approach, we can reconcile the equilibrium out-
come with the conventional wisdom: tax leadership by the large region risk
dominates and can possibly Pareto dominates the tax leadership by the small
region. We can also relate our result to the literature on cross border shop-
ping and on profit shifting.
1Baldwin and Krugman (2004) also make the same assumption of the large (core)
region’s leadership to show that equilibrium tax rates remain higher in the core region
than in the small (periphery).
2Ogawa (2013) showed that the simultaneous-move outcome may prevail as The Sub-
game Perfect Equilibrium if the capital is owned by residents in the countries. In this
paper we assume that the capital is owned by nonresidents as in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi
(2010), so that The Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the timing game are the two Stackelberg
equilibria.
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2 The model and the result
The model used follows closely Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010). There are
two regions, denoted by A and B, where capital is mobile and the two fiscal
authorities set capital taxes. The production in region i is represented by
the function Fi(Ki) = (ai − bKi)Ki where Ki is the amount of capital in
region i. The ai represents the vertical intercept of the demand for capital.
We assume that aA > aB, with identical gradient b > 0 in both regions.
The large region is region A with the higher vertical intercept. Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010) considered the case of identical a but different bi. We
will come back to this point later.
The welfare function of region i is the same as Eq. (2) of Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010):
Wi = Fi(Ki)−KiF ′i (Ki) + tiKi. (1)
Namely, it is the sum of labor income (Fi(Ki) −KiF ′i (Ki)) and the capital
tax income (tiKi). The total supply of capital is fixed K¯, and the capital
is perfectly mobile between regions. The arbitrage and the market clearing
conditions involve:
F ′A(KA)− tA = F ′B(KB)− tB, KA +KB = K¯,
which yield:
Ki(ti, tj) =
1
4
ai − aj + tj − ti + 2bK¯
b
(i, j = A,B, j 6= i). (2)
To insure interior solution, we assume:
Assumption 1 aA − aB < 4bK¯.
To derive the equilibrium of the Hamilton-Slutsky’s (1990) timing game,
we first derive the equilibrium of three tax games: (i) Simultaneous game
GN where each region chooses ti simultaneously and non-cooperatively, (ii)
Stackelberg Game GA where region A leads in the choice of the tax rates,
and (iii) Stackelberg Game GB where region B leads. For a given pair of
(aA, aB), Table 1 lists the tax rates and the welfare levels at the equilibria of
the three tax games.
The timing game has the pre-play stage where the regions decide whether
to move Early or Late. If both regions choose to move Early or Late, the
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GN GA GB
Region A
tA
1
4
(aA − aB) + bK¯ 2
5
(aA − aB) + 8
5
bK¯
1
5
(aA − aB) + 6
5
bK¯
WA
3
64
(aA − aB + 4bK¯)2
b
1
20
(aA − aB + 4bK¯)2
b
3
100
(aA − aB + 6bK¯)2
b
Region B
tB −1
4
(aA − aB) + bK¯ −1
5
(aA − aB) + 6
5
bK¯ −2
5
(aA − aB) + 8
5
bK¯
WB
3
64
(aA − aB − 4bK¯)2
b
3
100
(aA − aB − 6bK¯)2
b
1
20
(aA − aB − 4bK¯)2
b
Table 1: Tax rates and welfare levels in GN , GA and GB
induced tax competition is GN . If one region i chooses Early and the other
region j chooses Late, the tax competition is a sequential game Gi (i = A or
B), and ends up with the Stackelberg-equilibrium welfare levels (WLi ,W
F
j ).
Table 1 is consistent with Proposition 2 of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010),
so that The Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) of the timing game (Kempf
and Rota-Graziosi (2010, p. 772)) are the two Stackelberg equilibria of the
tax game. Next, in order to deal with the coordination issue due to the
multiplicity of the equilibria of the timing game, we use Harsanyi and Selten’s
(1988) risk-dominance criterion. Following Eq. (11) of Kempf and Rota-
Graziosi (2010), the equilibrium (Early, Late) risk-dominates (Late, Early)
if and only if:
Π ≡ (WLA −WNA )(W FB −WNB )− (W FA −WNA )(WLB −WNB ) > 0 (3)
In the Appendix we show that, opposite to Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010,
Proposition 3. (i)), the leadership of the large region is the risk-dominant
equilibrium of the timing game. Moreover, as in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi
(2010, Proposition 3. (ii)) and Amir and Stepanova (2006, Proposition 6),
our risk-dominating equilibrium (Early, Late) Pareto dominates (Late, Early)
when regional asymmetry is sufficiently high.3 Namely, Pareto-dominance
reinforces the risk-dominance.
Proposition 1 Under asymmetry in market power as represented by differ-
ent vertical intercepts of the capital demand (ai):
(i) The large region leadership risk-dominates. (ii) If the asymmetry is
sufficient (aA − aB > rbK¯ with r ≈ 2.872983), the large region leadership is
Pareto-dominant.
3That is, the small region B has a second-mover advantage for all (aA, aB), but the
large region A has a first-mover advantage with sufficient asymmetry.
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3 Discussion
In this section we give interpretations of the difference between our result
and Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010). We attribute the difference to their
implicit assumption on the asymmetry in the tax reaction function.
In our model, the tax reaction functions tˆi(tj) ≡ argmaxti Wi(ti, tj) are
tˆA(tB) =
1
3
tB+
1
3
(aA−aB)+ 2
3
bK¯, tˆB(tA) =
1
3
tA− 1
3
(aA−aB)+ 2
3
bK¯. (4)
Here, the reaction functions differ only by the vertical intercepts, with higher
intercept for the large region A. This implies that the large region A benefits
from higher taxes.
On the other hand, in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), production is
given by Fi(Ki) = (a−biKi)Ki. Large region A implies bA < bB (i.e. region A
is more productive (large in their sense)). The induced tax reaction function
of region i is:
tˆA(tB) =
bB
bA + 2bB
tB +
2K¯b2B
bA + 2bB
, tˆB(tA) =
bA
bB + 2bA
tA +
2K¯b2A
bB + 2bA
. (5)
Here, the regional asymmetry translates into difference in the gradioents of
the reaction functions. Namely, the large region is more is more responsive
to the tax choice of the small region (∂tˆA/∂tB > ∂tˆB/∂tA in (5)). Therefore,
tax leadership by the small region is preferable to induce a greater positive
reaction in the tax rate of the large region, than the other way round. In our
model, marginal tax responses are identical (∂tˆA/∂tB = ∂tˆB/∂tA = 1/3 in
(4)), and the leadership from the large region emerges. Amir and Stepanova
(2006, Proposition 6) is closely related to the points we made here. They
showed that in a Bertrand duopoly game the low-cost (large) firm is the
leader. The structure of risk-dominance and Pareto-dominance is identical
to our Proposition 1 (i) and 1 (ii) whereby their cost asymmetry implies
different markups. Our points here can also clarify why Kempf and Rota-
Graziosi’s (2011) cross-border shopping model obtains a risk-dominance of
the small region’s leadership. It is partly driven by the fact that the large
region is more responsive to the other region’s tax increase when their het-
erogeneity parameter θ is sufficiently small. Another factor is the shifts in
the intercepts of the reaction functions, depending on the location of the
cross-shoppers (Figure 2 of Kanbur and Keen, 1993). They favor the wel-
fare level of the small leadership equilibrium compared with that of the large
leadership equilibrium.4
4Once these effects are removed so that there is only different vertical intercept in the
5
We do not claim our modeling is better, but we believe that it is a more
natural modelling of asymmetry if we want to capture difference in market
power.
Appendix: proof of Proposition 1
For part (i), from the values in Table 1, the derivation of product is:
Π =
3
4000
K¯(aA − aB)(24b2K¯2 − (aA − aB)2)
b
(6)
Under Assumption 1, (aA − aB)2 < 16b2K¯2, so that Π > 0.
For part (ii), we can deriveW FB−WLB =
bK¯2
50
(
−(aA − aB)
2
b2K¯2
+ 2
aA − aB
bK¯
+ 14
)
>
0 under Assumption 1, andW FA−WLA =
bK¯2
50
(
−(aA − aB)
2
b2K¯2
− 2 aA − aB
bK¯
+ 14
)
≷
0 ⇐⇒ aA − aB ≶ rbK¯ ≈ 2.872983bK¯. When aA − aB > rbK¯, the outcome
of (Early, Late) Pareto-dominates that of (Late, Early). Q.E.D.
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